Domain · SOC / MDR monitoring

Does your SOC detect what threatens you?

We measure, read-only from your XDR console, what your monitoring actually sees: log sources that keep reporting, attack techniques covered, alert quality, the provider’s responsiveness. Then we track improvements until they are verified.

Situations

You are in the right place if…

  • You pay for a SOC or an MDR, but you do not know which attacks it would detect.
  • Your provider’s monthly reports count alerts, without saying what is not monitored.
  • Part of your systems (cloud, Microsoft 365, business applications) sends no logs, or went silent without anyone noticing.
  • The same alerts are closed as false positives, month after month, and the rule that produces them is never fixed.
  • The contract is up for renewal and you need to judge your provider on measured response times, not on its own reports.
Our conviction

Having a SOC does not prove the relevant threats are detected.

A SOC only detects what it receives, with the rules it applies. A log source gone silent, a disabled rule or a badly set threshold is enough to make an attack invisible, without the reports saying so.

So we start from the facts in your console, not from the provider’s reports: which sources went silent, which rules fire, which attack techniques produced no alert, how long each alert takes to be acknowledged and resolved. Then we relate them to the threats your activities face.

Our approach

From the threat to the verified alert.

We work with your provider, not in its place, and change nothing in your systems: we measure the set-up, not the people.

  1. 01Frame the scope and prioritiesYour monitoring console, your provider and its commitments, and the threats that matter most to your activities, drawn from your risk analysis and tied to MITRE ATT&CK attack techniques.

    You getPriority threats and the techniques they involve

  2. 02Measure coverage and responsivenessLog sources that keep reporting or go silent, rules that fire and those that only produce noise, ATT&CK techniques never seen, time to detect, acknowledge and resolve. We tell what is configured from what actually fired; when the tool does not expose rule configuration or alert recipients, we ask the provider for it.

    You getA coverage matrix by technique, and measured response times

  3. 03Test detection, as an optionOn an authorised scope, harmless actions check that an alert fires and is handled in time. These tests are scoped case by case, and agreed in writing with you and your provider.

    You getDated test results

  4. 04Improve and re-checkGaps become actions with an owner, a due date and a status: requests to the provider or internal actions. We check in the data that the gap has actually closed, and not for some other reason.

    You getAn improvement plan and its follow-up

What the texts say

What the texts expect of detection.

The texts do not only ask you to monitor: they ask for tested mechanisms, defined thresholds and sufficient resources.

  • DORADORA art. 10(1)

    Financial entities must have mechanisms to promptly detect anomalous activities, regularly tested.1

  • DORADORA art. 10(2) · DORA art. 10(3)

    These mechanisms provide multiple layers of control, alert thresholds and criteria that trigger incident response, and sufficient resources to monitor activity.23

  • NIS 2 · ReCyFNIS 2 art. 21(2), point (b) · ReCyF v2.5, objectif 12

    The directive lists incident handling among the measures Member States must require of entities; the ReCyF (working version) sets them the objective of having an organisation, processes and tools to prepare for and respond to security events.45

  • CNIL guideGuide CNIL sécurité, fiche 16, F16-PE-01 · Guide CNIL sécurité, fiche 16, F16-PE-06

    The CNIL recommends logging user activity, technical interventions and security events, and regularly checking that usable logs are present.67

Our engagement

The same topic, at three levels of engagement.

You choose the level; the scope and deliverables are set by contract.

Level 01

Monitor

We continuously measure the coverage and responsiveness of monitoring, and document the gaps.

Deliverables
  • ATT&CK coverage kept up to date, techniques never seen flagged
  • Check that log sources and agents keep reporting
  • Time to detect, acknowledge and resolve, compared with your targets
Level 03

Drive

We run the follow-up of improvements with your teams and your provider, without making the changes in your systems.

Deliverables
  • Management of the improvement plan: owners, due dates, statuses
  • Follow-up meetings with the provider, on measured facts
  • Re-check of each improvement delivered
Accelerators

What we bring from day one.

A read-only measurement console

Connected to your XDR console with a read-only key: source health, ATT&CK coverage, provider response times by severity and month, recomputed continuously. Cortex XDR today; Sophos and Trend Vision One being validated.

An alert quality review

Closed alerts reviewed decision by decision, rules that only produce noise, recurring false positives never fixed.

A tracked report and action plan

A weekly annotated report, findings tied to their evidence, and for each one an owner, a due date and a history.

Frequently asked questions

Before we start.

Do you replace our SOC or MDR?

No. We are not a SOC. We measure what your set-up detects and help you improve it with your provider, who remains in charge of monitoring and response.

Which platforms can you measure?

Cortex XDR, directly through its API. The Sophos and Trend Vision One connectors are built and being validated with a first client. For other tools, we work from exports.

Must our detection mechanisms be tested?

For a financial entity subject to DORA, yes: the regulation requires detection mechanisms to be regularly tested. For other organisations, it is the only way to know what monitoring really sees.1

Are detection tests risky for production?

Offered as an option, they are designed to be harmless: they imitate the trace of an attack without its effect. Their scope, timing and the people informed are agreed in writing before any test.

What access do you need?

A read-only API key on your XDR console, which gives log sources, alerts and incidents. We do not need administrator rights. Some tools do not let that kind of key read rule configuration: we then ask your provider for an export.

Check what your MDR sees and how it responds.

Using your XDR console or available exports, identify silent log sources, documented coverage, alerts actually observed and response times. Get prioritised gaps to discuss with your provider and a practical improvement plan. We can start with a focused baseline and compare results after 30 days where data allows. Read-only access, scope and price by quote; detection tests are optional and require written approval.

Sources

The excerpts quoted.

Exact text, in its original language, from the frameworks extracted from the official text.

Show the 7 excerpts quoted
  1. 1DORA art. 10(1)32022R2554-a10-p1
    Financial entities shall have in place mechanisms to promptly detect anomalous activities, in accordance with Article 17, including ICT network performance issues and ICT-related incidents, and to identify potential material single points of failure. All detection mechanisms referred to in the first subparagraph shall be regularly tested in accordance with Article 25.
    Normative force
    directly applicable EU law (regulation, level 1)
    Source
    Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector
    Version
    CELEX 32022R2554 — ELI reg/2022/2554
    Official text
  2. 2DORA art. 10(2)32022R2554-a10-p2
    The detection mechanisms referred to in paragraph 1 shall enable multiple layers of control, define alert thresholds and criteria to trigger and initiate ICT-related incident response processes, including automatic alert mechanisms for relevant staff in charge of ICT-related incident response.
    Normative force
    directly applicable EU law (regulation, level 1)
    Source
    Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector
    Version
    CELEX 32022R2554 — ELI reg/2022/2554
    Official text
  3. 3DORA art. 10(3)32022R2554-a10-p3
    Financial entities shall devote sufficient resources and capabilities to monitor user activity, the occurrence of ICT anomalies and ICT-related incidents, in particular cyber-attacks.
    Normative force
    directly applicable EU law (regulation, level 1)
    Source
    Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector
    Version
    CELEX 32022R2554 — ELI reg/2022/2554
    Official text
  4. 4NIS 2 art. 21(2), point (b)32022L2555-a21-p2-2
    incident handling;
    Normative force
    EU law to be transposed (directive): not directly applicable, requires national transposition
    Source
    Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive)
    Version
    CELEX 32022L2555 — ELI dir/2022/2555
    Official text
  5. 5ReCyF v2.5, objectif 12recyf:obj-12
    Les entités [importantes ou essentielles] mettent en œuvre une organisation, des processus et des outils adaptés pour se préparer et réagir à des événements de sécurité susceptibles d’affecter la réalisation de leurs activités ou la fourniture de leurs services.
    Normative force
    obligation (decree, resilience bill)
    Source
    ReCyF — Référentiel Cyber France (NIS 2, transposition nationale)
    Version
    2.5 du 17/03/2026 (version de travail)
    Status
    Working version: not binding until the transposition is enacted
    Official text
  6. 6Guide CNIL sécurité, fiche 16, F16-PE-01F16-PE-01
    Prévoir un système de journalisation (c’est-à-dire un enregistrement dans des fichiers journaux ou « logs ») des activités métier des utilisateurs (traces applicatives), des interventions techniques (y compris par les administrateurs), des anomalies et des évènements liés à la sécurité (traces techniques ou « système »).
    Normative force
    recommendation (soft law)
    Source
    Guide pratique RGPD — Sécurité des données personnelles
    Version
    2024 (mise à jour 2026)
    Official text
  7. 7Guide CNIL sécurité, fiche 16, F16-PE-06F16-PE-06
    S’assurer du bon fonctionnement du système de journalisation en intégrant les équipements dans un outil de supervision et vérifier régulièrement la présence de journaux exploitables.
    Normative force
    recommendation (soft law)
    Source
    Guide pratique RGPD — Sécurité des données personnelles
    Version
    2024 (mise à jour 2026)
    Official text